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The Free Banking Era, noted for numerous bank failures and large 
creditor losses, has been traditionally viewed as the experiment in laissez-
faire banking that failed. Current researchers have found evidence 
suggesting that bank failures and creditor losses were limited to selected 
states and have linked the cause of bank failures to periods of falling asset 
prices. Free banks were required to hold long-term assets as primary 
reserves for short-term liabilities. Current banking theory suggests that 
the maturity imbalance between assets and liabilities increases the free 
bank's exposure to interest rate risk. Some states imposed a secondary 
reserve, the specie reserve requirement, that partially corrected the 
imbalance. 
This paper proposes that the link between bank failures and falling 
asset prices can be explained in part by one of the regulations imposed on 
the free banks. Six free banking states were selected to test the hypothesis 
that the secondary reserve requirement reduced bank failures. The evidence 
indicates that high-specie-reserve states experienced fewer bank failures 
than low-specie-reserve states. 
3 
1. Introduction 
Throughout American history the banking industry has been closely 
regulated. From the beginning, restrictions have been imposed on bank entry 
and on bank conduct in one form or another. Generally, bank entry has been 
regulated by requiring the entrant to receive a special charter from a state 
or federal regulatory body and to meet minimum capital requirements, while 
bank conduct has been regulated by placing restrictions on portfolio 
selection, demand deposit creation, and capital adequacy. However, from 1837 
to 1863 entry was not determined by the approval of a state or federal body. 
This period, known as the Free Banking Era, has been viewed as an experiment 
in free - market banking that failed. Historians cite numerous bank failures, 
a plethora of bank note~ and large noteholder losses to be typical of this 
era. Contrary to this view, recent literature has pointed out that the banks 
which had been considered free actually operated under several restrictions; 
the stories of the numerous bank failures and large noteholder losses were 
limited to only a few states. .. i1 Q._, ..-.- --Ir .J rp 
,,,---(}/~ A-{:: J ~r '"' 
Economists such as Hugh Rockoff [ 3 ] , Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber 
[4, 5, 6, 7] have attempted to explain the causes of the wide variety of 
I 
banking experiences during this period. Rockoff contends that certain 
restrictions created perverse profit opportunities in which the stockholder 
of a free bank could make a quick capital gain on his investment by closing 
the bank. In Rockoff's theory, the capital gain arose from the transfer of 
wealth from the creditors to the stockholder when the assets were liquidated. 
Rolnick and Weber refute this claim, arguing that term-structure risk brought 
about many of the bank failures. According to Rolnick and Weber the 
stockholder closed the bank in order to minimize capital losses. Both 
4 
theories focused on a reserve requirement that linked the banks' liabilities 
to marketable securities; they also disregarded other portfolio restrictions. 
This paper examines an alternate restriction, the specie reserve requirement, 
and presents evidence suggesting that the lenient restrictions of this 
provision strongly influenced bank failure, given the other portfolio 
restrictions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains an historical 
overview of the free banking system and the major asset restriction. A 
review of the arguments of Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber are explained in 
section 3. Section 4 contains a discussion of the specie reserve provision 
and evidence indicating a link between the leniency of this provision and 
banks leaving the market. Univariate statistical tests are applied to the 
data. In Section 5 the emp efrical results are discussed in light of the 
Rolnick and Weber hypothesis. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks. 
2. Historical Overview 
Prior to the Free Banking Era, state legislatures regulated entry and 
bank activities through the licen~ing of individually constructed 
charters which contained provisions regulating th' activities of 
bank 
the 
specified bank. One such provision, common to all the charters, allowed the 
v 
banks to issue banknotes; that is, promissory notes circulating as currency. 
The banks, however, were required to redeem the banknotes for specie (gold or 
silver) on demand. Failure to do so would have jeopardized charter 
privileges. 
~ 
This system of regulating banks by legislative licencing gave way to 
the free banking system. Nineteen states enacted free banking laws; banks in 
5 
these states were "free" to enter the banking market and were subject to 
uniform restrictions such as minimum capital requirements. Unlike the 
...... 
charter banks, the free bank could not print banknotesJ but could obtain 
banknotes from the state banking authority by depositing marketable 
securities with the state authority. The state would hold the securities in 
reserve for the ultimate redemption of the banknotes. Like charter banks, 
the free banks were required to redeem the banknotes for specie on demand. 
If a bank failed to honor the request of a noteholder, the bank would be 
required to close and the securities would be sold by the state for the 
redemption of the circulating notes. 
The free banking states allowed two types of marketable securities as 
security for bank notes: state bonds and mortgages on unencumbered real 
estate. State bonds were allowed by eighteeen states , whereas mortgages 
were accepted as security in only a few states. 
The amount of banknotes issued by the state banking authorities was 
also specified by the laws. In the early years of free banking legislation, 
the states required that notes issued to banks be equal to the par value of 
the bonds. This restriction was known as the par evaluation provision. 
Later in the period the states required that the amount of notes issued to 
banks be equal to the market value of the bonds or the par value, whichever 
was less. A few states placed stronger restrictions by limiting note issue 
1 
to less than 100 percent of the market value of the bonds. 
Mortgages were treated differently than state bonds. In general, a 
mortgage was eligible as collateral if the mortgage value was no more than 
half the market value of the mortgaged land. The amount of notes issued by 
the authorities could not exceed the mortgage value. 
I 
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In addition to the market security requirement, some states enacted a 
specie reserve requirement. The restriction required banks to hold specie 
equal to a specified percentage of the amount of notes in circulation. 2 In 
general, the restrictions specified that the required amount of specie was to 
be on hand at all times, but some of the states allowed the required amount 
of specie to be the average specie holdings for a specified period. 
Although the market security and specie reserve provisions were enacted 
with the intent of protecting the noteholders of the free bank from losses, 
the evidence seems to indicate that large losses were experienced in several 
states. The critics have claimed that these losses were a result of the free 
competition among banks. Economic historian Bray Hammond, a representative 
of this group, states that "Free banking was an application of laissez faire 
to the monetary function. 113 Such association, however, is unwarranted, since 
the free banks were subject to various restrictions. Current researchers 
have reexamined the restrictions imposed on free banks and have concluded 
that some of the restrictions imposed on free banks influenced banking 
behavior. 
3. Current Theories 
Hugh Rockoff was one of the first to reexamine the free bank experience 
and to develop a theory on the impact of free bank restrictions on the free 
bank market. Rockoff found states that enacted the par evaluation 
restriction experienced a large number of bank failures and large noteholder 
losses. He also found that subsequent changes in the restriction from par 
evaluation to market evaluation reduced bank failures and noteholder losses. 
7 
From this evidence, Rockoff theorized ,~hat under certain circumstances 
the free bank investor in par evaluation states could make a quick capital 
gain by closing the bank. When the market value of the eligible security was 
below the par value of the security, the free bank investor would receive 
banknotes in an amount greater than his investment. The free bank investor 
could make a quick capital gain by issuing all the banknotes, presumably 
through a loan to himself or to a relative, then close the bank and leave 
town. This scenario, however, would have been possible only if the free 
bank investor had been able to convince the public to accept and hold the 
'-- --
banknotes at face value. Thus, the unsuspecting noteholder would have been 
holding banknotes that were not fully backed, and would have received only 
the market value of the securities, while the free bank investor would have 
received a capital gain on his investment equal to the difference between the 
par value and the market value of the securities. 
However, Rolnick and Weber also reviewed the free banking experience 
/ 
and found e vidence that refutes Rockoff's hypothesis. Although they did not 
deny that there were frequent bank failures and large noteholder losses 
-iwtt+rin some states, they rejected the hypothesis that the minor 
specifications in the laws caused free bank failures and noteholder losses. 
/ 
Rolnick and Weber presented an alternative theory which suggested that 
economic disturbances may have contributed to the bank failures and to the 
noteholder losses. 
According to Rolnick and Weber, a major drop in asset prices would have 
been suffic i ent to generate a run on the banks and would have possib l y forced 
some of the banks to close. As a proxy for asset prices, Rolni ck and Weber 
used bond prices to measure economic activity. Their reasoning was that 
bonds we re primarily used as collateral for note issue and in most cases 
8 
bonds were a large portion of the free bank's asset portfolio. A drop in 
bond prices would have lowered the market value of the bonds backing the 
notes as well as lowered the value of the free bank assets. If noteholders 
perceived that the drop in bond prices was large enough to jeopardize the 
solvency of the bank, they would have gone to the bank and attempted to 
redeem their notes at par value. The bank would not have honored the request 
if the noteholders were correct in their assessment. To honor the request 
would have meant an additional capital investment by the bank's stockholders. 
Instead the stockholders of the bank would have allowed the notes to be 
protested and the bank to close. Consequently, the bonds would have been 
sold by the state banking authorities at a price below the original purchase 
price and the noteholders would have been paid off at some fraction of the 
face value of the note. 
Even if the noteholders were wrong in their assessment of the financial 
position of the bank, the banker still could have been forced to close the 
bank in order to liquidate some of the assets. Rolnick and Weber suggested 
that some of the solvent banks may have closed permanently rather than 
continue to operate under such turbulent conditions. 
The Rolnick and Weber study contends that the market security provision 
I 
increased the interest rate risk exposure of the free banks' portfolio. Of 
course, interest, rate risk of any portfolio depends on all the assets of the 
portfolio. The free banker could have used his banknotes to purchase 
perfectly riskless assets such as specie, thereby reducing the probability of 
default on note redemption to zero. As the banker reduced the percentage of 
notes backed by specie the probability of default increased. In other words, 
the specie reserve provided security against interest rate risk of the market 
9 
securities backing the notes and reduced the probability of banks leaving the 
market. 
4. The Specie Reserve Provision 
The specie reserve requirements of six free banking states are 
examined in this section: New York, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Virginia, 
and Louisiana.
4 
These states represent a cross-section of specie reserve 
requirements and experiences. 
The specie reserve requirements enacted by these states varied from a 
zero to a thirty-three percent specie reserve requirement. Virginia and 
Louisiana represent states that enacted high specie reserve requirements -
5 greater than or equal to 20 percent. New York and Indiana represent states 
that enacted, and later repealed, 12 1/2 percent specie reserve reqirements. 
The repeal came shortly after the original enactment. Minnesota and 
Wisconsin represent states that never enacted a specie reserve requirement 
during the free banking period. 
The experiences varied from no bank failures and noteholder losses to 
numerous bank failures and large noteholder losses. Information concerning 
the experiences in each state was obtained from state auditor reports that 
the banks prepared for the state banking authorities.
6 
The number of banks 
that entered and exited was collected from these reports. Banks that exited 
were divided into two classes: banks that closed and banks that failed. A 
closed bank was defined as a bank that was able to redeem its banknotes at 
par (i.e., no noteholder losses) whereas a failed bank was defined as a bank 
that was unable to redeem its notes at par (i.e., noteholders suffered 
losses). A detailed listing of each bank that operated in a given state was 
I 
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made and the tabulation of all closing and failing banks was compiled from 
this list. The following discussion presents the final compilation for each 
state. 
4.1 The Experiences of the States 
Initial support for the hypothesis that a lenient specie reserve 
requirement increased the incidence of bank exits is revealed by the data 
presented in Table 1. (Since the the size of the banking markets varied from 
state to state, the number of banks that operated under each law in each 
state and the percentage of operating banks that left the market for each 
state are also included in Table 1.) 
The aggregate experience for each state indicates that exits were 
generally higher in zero percent specie reserve states than in high specie 
reserve states. The high specie reserve states, Virginia and Louisiana, 
record the fewest number of banks leaving the market. In the 12 1/2 percents 
specie reserve states, the evidence shows conflicting experiences. Indiana 
experienced a large number of bank exits, while New York experienced few 
bank exits. This result also holds after adjusting for market size. In the 
states that did not enact a specie reserve requirement, the number of banks 
leaving the market were the highest among the states examined. Even after 
adjusting for market size, these states had the highest percentages of bank 
exits, recording at least 30 percent of the operating banks leaving the 
market. 
The states are also grouped according to the laws under which they 
operated and are presented in Table 2. In this table the number of free 




ENTRY AND EXIT IN SELECTED FREE BANKING STATES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 7 (1) 
Reserve Total Total Total Total Percentage 
State Date Requirement Operated Closed Failed Exited Exited 
Indiana 1856-1863 0% 23 6 1 7 30.4% 
Minnesota 1857-1863 0% 16 2 9 11 68.8% 
New Yorka 1841-1863 0% 426 122 31 153 35.9% 
Wisconsin 1842-1863 0% 140 42 37 79 56.4% 
Indiana b 1852-1855 12 1 /2% 93 32 23 55 59.1% 
New York b 1838-1840 12 1/2% 74 2 3 5 6.80% 
Virginia 1851-1860 20% 23 4 0 4 17.40% 
Louisiana 1853-1859 33% 7 0 0 0 0.0% 
aThe New York tally does not include charter banks that entered under the free 
banking law after their charter expired. Information on the redemption rates of 
four New York banks was not available and is not included in the number of banks 
exiting. 
b Information on twenty-seven Indiana banks was not available and is not included in 
the number of banks exiting. 
/ 
Experience 






FREE BANK EXPERIENCES GROUPED ACCORDING TO 
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
Specie Reserve Requirement 
0% 12 1/2% 20% and Above 
605 167 30 
28.4% 20.3% 13.3% 
12.9% 15.6% 0.0% 
41.3% 35.9% 13.3% 
I 
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with the percentage of banks that closed, the percentage that failed and the 
percentage of banks that left the market. As in Table 1, the figures 
indicate that the banks operating under the more lenient zero percent 
requirement had a higher percentage of banks leaving the market than those 
operating under the stricter requirements. These figures combined with those 
in Table 1 appear to indicate that differing specie reserve requirements 
among the states could explain the number of banks leaving the market. 
4.2 Univariate Test 
The notion that differing specie reserve requirements explains exits is 
strengthened by the results of a univariate test performed on the data. The 
evidence in the previous section indicates that a larger percentage of banks 
left the market under a lenient specie reserve requirement than under a 
strong specie reserve requirement. Since the evidence is represented as 
proportions, the appropriate test is the difference between two sample 
. 7 proportions. 
Three variables were constructed for the test: the failure rate, the 
closure rate, and the below par rate. The failure rate is defined as the 
number of banks that failed divided by the number of banks that operated 
under the particular restriction. This variable measures the percentage of 
all existing banks that were failures. Using this percentage facilitates 
comparisons between states having different numbers of banks. 
The closure rate is defined as the number of banks that closed divided 
by the number of banks that operated during the free banking period. As with 
the failure rate closing banks are divided by operating banks to facilitate 
comparison across states. This variable measures the percentage of all 
14 
existing banks that closed. Both the failure rate and closure rate are 
constructed in order to isolate the effects of the specie reserve provision 
on banks exiting the market. 
The below par rate is defined as the number of failures divided by the 
number of banks that exited. This variable measures the percentage of banks 
that were leaving the market that failed. The purpose of this variable is to 
indicate the effects that different specie reserve restrictions had on the 
likelihood that an exiting bank would be a failure. 
The observations for each variable are categorized under three specie 
restrictions: Zero percent, Twelve percent, and Twenty percent and Above. 
(Let zero, twelve, and twenty and above be assigned group numbers 1, 2, 3, 
respectively, and let the sample proportion of group i be denoted as X .• ) 
l. 
·Since it is expected that a lenient specie reserve would result in a larger 
number of failures, the hypothesis tested is that the mean of the failure 
rate, closure rate, and below-par rate under a zero specie reserve is 
significantly larger than the means of the twelve percent or the twenty 
percent and above specie requirements: 
Hl 
1 xl - x < 2 0, 
H2 
1 xl - x < 3 0, and 
H3 
1 x2 - x3< 0, 
where Hj is the jth hypothesis being tested. Alternately, the null 
1 
hypothesis states that there is no difference between the proportions. 
The results of the tests, given in Table 3, indicate that there is a 
significant difference in the failure rates between states that enacted 
"'t. 
specie reserve requirements less than and equal to twelve percent, and states 
15 
' 
that enacted specie reserve requirements of twenty percent and above. Both 
the sample proportions of zero percent and twelve percent are significantly 
larger than the sample proportions of twenty percent and above at the 99 
percent and 95 percent significance level, respectively. However, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the difference in proportions of zero and 
twelve percent specie reserve. 
The evidence on the closure rate in Table 3 also indicates a 
significant difference between the zero percent, and the twelve and twenty 
and above reserve requirement at the 95 percent significance level and at the 
99 percent significance level, respectively. The null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected for the difference in proportions of twelve percent and twenty 
percent and above. 
Finally, the test on the below-par rate indicates that the specie 
reserve does not show a significant difference in the likelihood that an 
exiting bank will fail; that is the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
In summary, the evidence supports the previous conclusion that the 
enactment of a high specie reserve requirement reduced bank failures and 
closures. A bank that existed under a strong specie reserve restriction was 
less likely to fail or close than a bank that existed under a lenient specie 
I 
reserve requirement. In both tests the twelve percent specie reserve proved 
to be a critical point in specie holdings. A specie reserve greater than 
twelve percent appeared to reduce the number of failures while a specie 
reserve of twelve percent and lower significantly increased the number of 
16 
TABLE 3 
DIFFERENCES IN FAILURE RATES, CLOSURE RATES, AND BELOW PAR-RATES 
MEASURES UNDER SPECIE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
Measure Comparison of Specie Reserve Reqirements 
0% & 0% & 12 1/2% 
Differences in 12 1 /2% 20 & Above 20 & Above 
Failure Rates i. -2.7 12.9 15.6 
t Ratio -0. 762 3 .27* 2.21** 
Closure Rates % 8 .1 15.1 7.0 
t Ratio 2.35** 3.96* 1.00 
Below-Par Rates % -11.9 31.22 43.3 
t Ratio -1.57 1.34 1.73 
* - significant at the 1% level. 
**- significant at the 5% level. 
I 
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closures. However, there was no significant difference in the likelihood 
that an exiting bank failed. This result is not surprising since the 
likelihood of a bank failing or closing also depends on the current market 
conditions. The effects of market conditions on banks exiting under 
different specie reserve requirements are analyzed in the next section. 
5. Comparison with the Rolnick and Weber Hypothesis 
The analysis in the preceding section indicated that there may have 
been some link between the number of banks leaving the market in a particular 
state and the type of specie reserve requirement that the state required. 
One explanation of this link is that the specie reserves helped reduce the 
risk of default associated with an economic downturn. The specie reserve 
could have helped free bankers meet unanticipated demands for specie that may 
have been initiated by the fall in bond prices. The reserves could have also 
offset noteholder losses from the bonds, devaluation. 
The reason for the specie reserve's influence is clear. Since the 
price elasticity with respect to the change in interest rates is larger for a 
long term asset than a short term liability, a decrease in the interest rate 
would result in a larger depreciation of the assets than the liabilities. 
Consequently, a large drop in interest rates, as Rolnick and Weber suggested, 
would induce noteholders to redeem their notes. If the free banker correctly 
anticipated a change in asset prices or effectively adjusted his portfolio to 
meet the change in demand for specie, he could have prevented a suspension of 
specie redemption. Therefore, by requiring free bankers to back a portion of 
the banknotes in specie, the downside risk from falling bond prices could 
have been partially mitigated. 
18 
In addition, noteholders in high specie reserve states may not have 
reacted to a fall in bond prices, since the specie holdings may have covered 
the bond depreciation. 8 If noteholders disregarded this information and 
attempted to redeem their banknotes, the bank may have been forced to suspend 
specie payments and forced into liquidation. As long as the depreciation of 
bonds was less than the specie holdings, noteholders would not have suffered 
losses; the bank would have had sufficient specie to cover the loss in asset 
value. 
This explanation does not refute the hypothesis proposed by Rolnick and 
Weber_,,?;;'hat noteholders may have reacted to changes in bond prices, but it 
does contend that falling bond prices may not necessarily be the only factor 
determining bank failures. The specie reserve requirement may have been a 
factor in determining bank failures and closures. To check this hypothesis 
the sample of state experiences was examined under falling bond price periods ----
as specified in the Rolnick and Weber study. 9 The raw data is presented in 
Table 4.
10 
There were 135 banks identified as exiting during a falling bond 
price period. The break'tiown of banks that exited indicates that there were 
sixty-two bank failures under the zero specie reserve, twelve under the 
twelve percent specie reserve during the falling bond price period. 
The number of failures and closures as a percentage of the total number 
of banks that exited is shown in Table 4. It indicates that a larger 
percentage of exiting banks failed under the lenient specie reserve 
requirements than under the strict specie reserve requirements. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a lenient specie 
19 
TABLE 4 
BANK EXITS UNDER FALLING BOND PRICES AND 
SPECIE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
Reserve Requirements 
0% 12 1 /2% 20% and Above 
Total Operated 605 167 30 
Total Exited 108 23 4 
Total Failed 62 12 0 
(57.4) (52.1) (0 .o) 
Total Closed 46 11 4 
(42.6) (47.9) (100) 
( ) Percentage of total exited 
I 
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reserve requirement, given the market security restriction, may have 
increased the number of failures. However, further testing is necessary 
before any conclusive statement can be made about the effects of a specie 
reserve requirement on bank failures. 
6. Conclusion 
The evidence indicates that a specie reserve requirement influences 
bank closings and bank failures. States enacting a strong specie reserve 
requirement showed a significant difference in bank failings and closings 
from states that enacted -lenient specie reserve requirements. This study 
suggests that the discrepancy in experiences between states with different 
specie reserve requirements may be due to a link between the short term 
liability (i.e. banknotes) and the long term asset (i.e. state bonds). This 
hypothesis implies that the free banknotes made up a substantial portion of a 
free bank's liabilities; hence, state bonds were a substantial portion of a 
free bank's assets. Therefore, in order to make a conclusive statement about 
the influence of the specie reserve requirement on free banking experience, 
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1The number of statutes does not necessarily indicate the. number of 
restrictions imposed on the free bank. For example, Tennessee enacted 
sixteen statutes but these statutes contained the same number of restrictions 
as New York's which contained thirty-three statutes. 
2 
Louisiana enacted a reserve requirement that required banks to hold specie 
or ninety day commercial paper equal to 100% of the notes in circulation. 
3 Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America From the Revolution to the Civil 
War, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 573. 
4
virginia's free banking law required a legislative charter and approval. 
Therefore, some may not consider Virginia a free banking state. However, the 
charters were uniform in requirements, except for the minimum capital 
requirement. In addition, the historical records of Virginia indicate that 
the legislature did not refuse any requests and that a significant number of 
charters did not go into operation. Contemporaries have claimed that the 
v 
legislative approval was no different than the state banking authority 
accepting applications. See [ 1] for additional informa.tion. 
5 
In Louisiana, banks were required to hold one hundred 
outstanding notes in specie ~r 90 day commercial paper. 
percent of their 
In addition to the 
reserve requirement backing banknotes, Louisiana banks were required to hold 
33 percent of their deposits in specie. Since the noteholders i n Louisiana 
free banks had first lien on the assets, and in general the amount of 
deposits equaled or exceeded note issue, the note issued by the Louisiana 
bankers were backed by thirty-three percent specie reserves. None of 
Louisiana's free banks left the market. 
24 
6 Most of the reports can be found in the United States Congressional Serial 
Set [8]. Additional information was obtained from state auditor reports (See 
[6]). 
7
The appropriate test statistic is: 
where S is the standard error of the difference between two sample 
pl- Pz 
proportions: 
'\! ~ ~ [(nl + n2)/nln2], 
A 
and p is the expected proportion of the combined sample and q is the 
complement of p. 
8The free banking laws also contained a provision that allowed the state 
banking authority to call in banknotes when the market value of the 
securities was less than the amount of notes issued. The noteholder would 
also have the assurance that corrective measures would be taken. 
9This study includes the first part of the N.Y. experience; the Rolnick and 
Weber study did not. 
1 ~ test on proportions cannot be used in this analysis. Since the data is 
divided into time segments, the base number of banks operating /8ries in each 
time segment. 
